Of the 6000 products in the average supermarket, a few receive special displays, advertising, and prices in a given week, but the great majority are assigned prices by simple percentage markups within category, adjusted, if necessary, for competitive conditions and special price endings. Missing is any direct consideration of actual customer price response.
Introduction
If an OR/MS team from Mars should enter the typical U.S. supermarket and measure sales response to price by varying shelf prices, it would be surprised to find that the store seems to be pricing each item much too low to maximize profit. The store acts as if the customer is considerably more sensitive to prices than customer behavior in the store seems to indicate.
There is a reason for this. The store has a special concern. Even though a customer, once in the store, may buy the item at a higher price, will he come back? A pricing policy that maximizes profits taking into account the problem of bringing the customer into the store may call for much lower prices than would be implied by measurements taken once the customer is there.
Supermarket chains go to great effort to project an overall impression of low prices and good value for the money. They run newspaper ads featuring reduced prices and set up special displays in the stores to emphasize sale items. These are often real bargains with the store not infrequently taking a net loss on an individual item.
However, the great bulk of items are not so featured and it is necessary to have a pricing policy for them. By and large stores use a simple markup over cost. This does not take into account customer price response, and so, in an important sense is ignoring customer preferences.
However, since the store does not maximize profit on individual items, the question arises whether individual price measurements have any meaning or usefulness to the store.
The purpose of this paper is to contend that they do and to develop the beginnings of a theory of how to use such information.
Notation and definitions
We look at the store's customers in aggregate and suppose a collective utility function. For a fixed time period, utility depends on the quantities of various goods bought by the customer and the total money spent on them.
The quantities bought also represent the sales of the store since the customers' spending is the store's revenue. Let n = number of items s. = quantity bought of item i (units) 1 Practically, the sketches mean that the more units of any item the customers buy, the less they value an additional unit. In addition, the more money spent in total, the more they prefer not to spend another dollar.
Although virtually all items in a supermarket are sold in discrete units, we take all quantities to be continuous to avoid useless complexities.
3.
Customers' problem once in the store
The customers are assumed to make purchases to maximize their aggregate utility, given the prevailing prices in the store. In other words, for fixed P = (P1 ... Pn ) they solve:
The concavity of u guarantees a global maximum for some set of purchased quantities s.
Since the store will not carry items it cannot sell, we shall assume that the solution of C1 leads to s > 0. Then the maximum is an interiorpoint and satisfies the necessary conditions 1 n These in turn imply a total customer spending (store dollar sales) of
The functions si(P) are those we believe a store might feasibly measure by in-store experiment.
The general shape of si(p) would presumably be: 
Store's problem given customer in store The store's problem is, given the way customers respond to price, to set those prices. We investigate several methods for doing this. In this section we again assume the customer is in the store.
Maximizing Customers' Utility Subject to Profit Constraint:
Suppose the store somehow knows the customers utility function and chooses to maximize it subject to making a fixed profit. Then the store solves:
where c i = incremental cost to the store of item i (dol/item)
T= minimum profit for store (dollars).
Since customer utility can always be increased by decreasing prices, maximum utility will be reached only when the profit constraint is satisfied by equality and so, without loss of optimality, we can replace the inequality with equality in (Sl.1). Furthermore a solution with any prices zero would mean the store should not stock the product. Therefore, we suppose in any real solution > 0 and use this fact as convenient.
Maximizing Profit Subject to Utility Constraint.
In this case the store would solve S2: Find to
where u = minimal customer utility.
We shall assume that (pi-ci)si(p) is concave in p. Also we can i again assume without loss of optimality that the utility constraint is satisfied by an equality in (S2.1) and real situtations lead to > 0.
Equivalence of S1 and S2
Suppose u is the customer utility achieved in S1 by maximizing utility subject to the profit constraint r = . We show that, if the same value of u is made the utility constraint in maximizing store profit in S2, then the is made the utility constraint in maximizing store profit in S2, then the same sets of prices maximize customer utility in S1 and store profit in S2.
Furthermore, the maximal profit in S2 is T .
Theorem: If u in S2 equals max u from S1, the set of p maximizing 7T in S2
is the same as the set maximizing u in S1 and max = T .
Proof: Consider S1. Since at optimum p > o, constraints (S1.2) can be ignored. Treating (Sl.l) as an equality and introducing a Lagrange multiplier, A, we create the unconstrained problem
We solve SA for (A). This solves S1 if is chosen such that T(p) = T Call such ,
0
A similar argument transforms S2 into the unconstrained problem
Solving S2A solves S2 when is chosen to make u(p) = u .
It can be seen that SlA and S2A are the same since X and are constants as far as the maximization is concerned. In other words, S2A will be solved by any p that solves
The RHS of S2B is just SA and so if p solves SA for , it solves S2A for I = 1/A and conversely.
Therefore the specific values p( X ) and X , solve S2A with
But u(p( X )) = max u and max u = u by assumption of the theorem. Thus 1/Xo is the required value of that makes u(a) = u and S2 is solved by p( X ). Since we have already seen r(p( X )) = r we now know that any maximizing S1 maximizes S2 with max X = .
A similar argument works the converse: any p maximizing ff subject to u=uo will max u subject to = 0 and will give max u = u .
The above results display the tradeoff between the objectives of store profit and customer utility and show the existance of efficient prices which permit these objectives to be as high as possible up to the point of tradeoff between the two. However, this development supposes the customers are already in the store and their sales response to price s(p) is measured there. As discussed in the introduction, a major issue is whether an individual customer comes back to the store after shopping there or shops at the store in the first place.
4.
Customers' propensity to shop at store
We now hypothesize that although there are many ways to bring customers to the store and keep them coming (e.g., special features, product variety, cleanliness, pleasant surroundings, and friendly service) one important way is to provide low prices throughout the store, or better yet provide high value of customer utility. Thus the store might choose to maximize customer utility subject to a profit constraint or, as we have seen to be equivalent, to maximize profit subject to a utility constraint. In the last form, the value of utility, if it could be made operational, would become a parameter which the store could adjust. Therefore, we proceed to find the prices a store should charge according to the following assumptions: (1) the customer is buying to maximize utility (i.e., behaving according to s i si(p) from C1)
(2) the store is pricing to maximize profit subject to a customer utility constraint as in S2.
Starting from the lagrangian for S2, Notice, however, hat pw' is independent of the particular item being priced (i.e. of i). Thus, given the measurements, one constant sets all prices. This constant expresses the store's desire to lower its prices to keep the customers' satisfaction high and maintain store loyalty.
Measurement Issues
Is it practical to measure price response as required by (4.4)?
Today, no. Although many people have made in-store price response measurements, the task requires much effort, particularly to collect accurate sales data. This usually means taking inventory at the start, tallying all quantities restocked on the shelves , and taking inventory at the end.
By contrast the introduction of point-of-purchase sales recording equipment drastically changes the situation. Sales in machine readable form in great time and item detail are possible. The quantity of data is, in fact, a little overwhelming and much needs to be learned about handling it effectively for analytic purposes.
In supermarkets optical scanning equipment that reads the Universal Product Codes (UPC) offers the prospect of automatic sales recording.
As of this writing, however, only 100 stores in the U.S. are equipped with scanners so that we are not talking about an immediate revolution.
Yet, many stores have electronic check-out equipment on which it is possible, with moderate special effort, to record sales by item. Therefore, to investigate the measurement potential of UPC, we ran a 16 week, 8 store experiment in a Boston supermarket chain in which daily sales and price data were collected for the frozen orange juice category (16 items).
It is not our purpose here to do a full scale evaluation of the potential of UPC data for marketing measurements, but we wish to present preliminary indications that price measurements may be feasible and so give a flavor of the basic data. Figure 3 shows frozen orange juice sales in ounces for the 8 stores over the period July 12 to November 6, 1976. Prominent is day-of-week variation, Saturday being the peak day. Also evident is seasonalvariation, (e.g., down in August because of vacations), and at least two noticeable special feature weeks (weeks ending Sept. 18
and November 6). Cr 0I ' :
tEEK Fig. 5 . Effect of price changes on sales of selected frozen orange juice items. In the first and third 4-week periods normal prices were in effect. In the second and fourth periods the two pairs of stores had different prices, switching roles between the two cases.
detectable, at least in this instance. Secondly, response appears to be quick, i.e. it shows up in the first week. Thirdly, the effect also appears to be reversible: it disappears in the normal third period and is reversed in the fourth period. Detectibility, speed of response, and reversibility are obviously all key issues in designing on-going systems. We certainly do not claim to have resolved all these issues in general; much work will have to be done but these initial results are encouraging.
Discussion
The theory developed here focuses on a central idea: a two-step process for relating in-store response measurements to price-setting. A variety of other considerations also enter pricing. These include competitive prices, price ending effects, price-quality perceptions, and the concept of pricequality categories to meet the needs of different market segments (e.g., good, better, best). Some of these effects might be incorporated in the theory, others are probably best left for management adjustment.
A number of theoretical issues deserve further investigation. One of these is disaggregation of the customers. Another is the explicit consideration of competition: as competing stores vary their customer utility constant, what happens to share and profit?
However, the main results have already identified a theory which shows promise of providing useful pricing calculations based on empirical measurements and a policy parameter.
